THE ENVIRONMENTAL COURT PROPOSAL:
REQUIEM, ANALYSIS, AND COUNTERPROPOSAL
The recent growth and high visibility of what is called "environmental" litigation have prompted serious debate whether a
special judicial system should be created to handle such matters.'
Several current proposals suggest the creation of a special judicial entity to hear civil actions 2 of an "environmental" nature.
The jurisdiction of the specialized court would be limited to
those cases. 3
Congress sensed the need for reform in this area several
years ago. In 1972, it directed that the President, acting through
the Attorney General, conduct-a full investigation of the feasibility of establishing an environmental court system. 4 Pursuant to
the mandate, the Attorney General prepared three hypothetical
judicial systems. The first called for the creation of a court to
hear environmental cases generally, with both original and appellate jurisdiction. The court would have exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases within its compass. 5 The second proposal was for
the establishment of a court to review all federal agency orders
affecting the environment.6 The third model would authorize a
court to review all orders of designated federal agencies. 7 All
three models assumed that the court would have exclusive jurisdiction and would be created under article III as a constitutional
court." The authors of the Report ultimately decided against rec'See,

e.g., H. R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1972); Whitney, The Case

for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Whitney I].
2 There would be a serious problem in conferring jurisdiction over criminal matters
to a specialized court because of the constitutional provision that trial of all crimes shall
be held in the state in which the crime was committed. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See
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I See generally REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-7 to -12; Rightmire, Special Federal Courts,
13 ILL. L. REV. 15 (1918). Jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the federal
courts of general jurisdiction, basically extends to all cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-63 (1970).
4 Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §9, 86 Stat. 899.
REPORT, supra note 2, at V- 1 to -2.
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8Id. V-3.
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ommending implementation of any of the proposed models or
any similar proposal.9
This Comment will examine the problems which impelled
the suggestion of a special environmental court and the reasons
for its apparent rejection. An alternative system which attempts
to solve the problems and at the same time avoids the criticisms
aimed at the proposed environmental court system will then be
offered.
I.

BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM

A.

Uniformity of Law

One of the principal arguments in favor of establishing a
specialized court is that it would increase the uniformity and
certainty of the law. 10 Professor Scott Whitney, one of the chief
advocates of a specialized environmental court," recommended
that the new court system be granted exclusive trial and appellate jurisdiction over environmental litigation. 12 This suggestion
follows from his belief that federal environmental law is full of
conflicting decisions. He detailed the conflict 3 by focusing on
the varying results reached by courts of appeals in interpreting
and enforcing the duties
set forth in the National Environmental
14
Policy Act (NEPA).
Supreme Court review is not really a solution to this lack of
uniformity. Petitioning for certiorari is simply too costly, and its
granting too rare, for it to be an effective tool in the general run
of cases.' 5 While the suggestion that a specialized appellate body
can solve this problem is seductive, there is nothing in the pro9

1d. VIII-1 to -4. This conclusion was the same as that suggested by the overwhelming consensus of replies to letters sent to government agencies and private organizations
soliciting comments on the proposed models. Id. A-1 to -2, B-1 to -2.
" See Whitney I, supra note 1, at 486-501. See also Griswold, The Need for a Court.of
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1156 (1944).
This argument is generally applied only to the appellate courts. With the exception
of the Court of Claims and other single-body judicial structures, the policies favoring
ready access to geographically local courts have outweighed the supposed need for uniformity at the trial court level.
I See Whitney, The Case for Creating A Special Environmental Court System-A Further
Comment, 15 WN1. & MARY L. REV. 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Whitney II]; Whitney I,
supra note 1.
12 Whitney I, supra note 1, at 487. This corresponds to the Traynor proposal in the
tax field. See Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedurefor FederalIncome, Estate, and
Gift Taxes-A Criticism and A Proposal, 38 COLuM. L. REv. 1393, 1427-29 (1938).
13 Whitney I, supra note 1, at 490-501.
1442 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
s See Griswold, supra note 10, at 1156. See also Whitney I, supra note 1, at 486.
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posed structural modification which would guarantee the desired uniformity.
An existing specialized court, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 16 offers a good testing ground for Whitney's
thesis. If his thesis is correct, the law created by that court should
possess an admirable uniformity and clarity. A recent study of its
functioning indicated, however, that it not only has failed to set17
tie the law, but that it has positively added to the confusion.
Extension of this conclusion suggests that the most that can be
said of a specialized environmental court structure is that it
would provide the possibility of improvement over the present
scheme. The question then reduces to whether the uncertain
improvement justifies the structural change.' 8
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the legal chaos that
Whitney found prevalent in the environmental field really exists.
Two other respected commentators argue:
Although notable examples of conflict exist, the overall
pattern is one of surprising consistency in the resolution
of the difficult policy questions involved in applying environmental laws. More consistency might be desirable,
but the small margin of gain hardly seems to justify the
establishment of a separate court system.' 9
Even if Whitney's findings are correct, the inclusion of trial
courts in the environmental court system raises another problem: whether uniformity at the trial court level outweighs the
policies favoring access to geographically local courts.
Regardless of whether trial courts are included in an environmental court system, there is no apparent reason why uniformity of environmental law is more desirable than uniformity
lb The court is empowered only to hear appeals from final judgments or orders of

the Customs Court and from certain decisions or findings of the Tariff Commission, the
Patent Office, and the Secretary of Commerce. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1541-44 (1970).
17 Metzer & Musrey, Judicial Review of Tariff Commission Actions and Proceedings, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 285, 339-41 (1971).

is The Commerce Court is another example of the rule that structural change in the
judicial system does not necessarily lead to the desired results. It was established to
expedite litigation, create a body of experts, and harmonize agency decisions-just as the
proposed environmental court would be. See REPORT, supra note 2, at B-68 (response of
the Interstate Commerce Commission); Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court, 8 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).

As Nathanson pointed out, specialized courts have not displayed notable mastery of
the art of statutory interpretation. Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L.
REV. 996, 1000 n.16 (1971).
'9 Hines & Nathanson, PreliminaryAnalysis of Environmental Court ProposalSuggested in
the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, in REPORT, supra note 2, at C-I,
C-16 to -17 (footnotes omitted).
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under any other body of federal law. 2 ° Furthermore, it is hard
to ignore the argument that "[a]n environmental court would
tend to encourage proliferation of other specialized courtssuch as for civil rights, welfare, education, health [and] agriculture .... " Our present system tolerates some lack of uniformity among the courts of appeals; it is a fact of life in the federal
court system that there will not be total certainty about what
the law "is." The remedy, if any, should be a general one, reaching all areas and conflicts.
The policy of developing a unified body of federal environmental law should not constitute a major factor in determining whether an environmental court system should be
created. The policy may not be as strong as initial reactions
might indicate, and the possibility of improvement is too uncertain to justify the creation of a new judicial body.
B.

The Caseload Factor

Another argument in favor of creating an environmental
court system is that our present courts are overburdened, 22 and
that the congestion can be significantly ameliorated by establishing a new judicial body to handle all environmental cases. 2 3 The
classic statement supporting this position was made by Judge
Skelly Wright, who observed that current environmental cases
represent "only the beginning of what promises to be a flood of
new litigation-litigation seeking
judicial assistance in protecting
24
our natural environment.
There is, however, serious doubt whether this flood will actually commence. Statistics from the Administrative Office of
United States Courts indicate that as of June 30, 1973, there
were approximately 845 cases pending in federal courts which
could be identified as "environmental," representing less
than
25
seven-tenths of one percent of the total federal caseload.
20

See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 596-604 (1969). But see text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
21 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the American Bar Association).
22 Cf. Carrington, supra note 20.
23 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 49.
24 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir. 1972).
In direct contrast to these views, some knowledgeable observers believe that the
environmental caseload will decrease as the administrative process begins to adjust and
becomes more responsive. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the American Bar Association).
25 REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-12.
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It is of course true that large caseloads are not necessary to
justify a separate specialized court. For example, only 398 cases
were pending in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on
June 30, 1972.26 But while there may not be a large number of
"environmental" cases, they do seem to demand an inordinate
amount of time and expertise. In support of an environmental
court system, the General Services Administration noted:
This agency has been involved in an excess of 400 cases
since January 1, 1970. Seven cases involved significant
environmental issues. One case involved a minor environmental issue. While this percentage may seem low,
these seven cases are among the most significant cases
involving this agency and are the most time-consuming
and complex.27
As a rule, neither numbers nor complexity constitute compelling arguments for creating special courts to ease the burden
on the general court system. Unless there is some special quality
inherent in a certain class of cases, it would make more sense
merely to devote additional resources to the general courts. The
environmental cases seem to have such a quality: The problems
they present are not soluble by a mere increase in judicial manpower. Rather, the most difficult problems they create involve
the courts' lack of technical expertise. This suggests not simply
that another entity is needed, but that an expert entity should be
created, one that is not daunted by the complexities into which it
must plunge.
C. Expertise
The bulwark of the proponents of an environmental court
system is the thesis that extant courts do not have the expertise
to handle environmental litigation efficiently. Whitney argues
not that any federal judge or court . . . is not capable,
given "world enough and time," to develop a mastery of
216
Id. I11-13. It should be noted in any case that the relevance of these comparative
caseload statistics to the environmental court controversy is made questionable by the
concentration of much customs litigation around New York City, where the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals sits. Without the specialized court, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York would be the forum for a huge number of customs cases.
Environmental cases, however, may be expected to arise throughout the country, so that
no single court would be overburdened. Thus, to the extent that volume of litigation is a

relevant factor in deciding if specialized courts should be established, the smaller but
more concentrated customs and patent caseload might militate more strongly in favor of
a specialized court, while the larger but more dispersed environmental caseload would
not.
27

Id. B-63 (response of the General Services Administration).
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these matters. Rather, the question is essentially one of
staffing, workload, and efficient judicial allocation of
functions....
Like other special fields of the law, environmental
matters involve highly specialized and intricate questions which could be adjudicated more efficiently by
courts with expertise acquired from continual application of environmental statutes and regulations to technically complex issues .... [A]lthough existing federal
courts can intellectually grasp the subject matter, given
enough time and effort, to continue to burden general
courts with the increasing volume of complex and technical environmental cases would interfere with existing
priorities28 and aggravate the pressures of overcrowded
dockets.

Others disagree that this sort of expertise would be a benefit. The most famous stand against specialized courts was written by Simon Rifkind. His thesis was that the "expertise" required in the judicial process is not technical know-how, but
rather "the unique capacity to see things in their context. '2 9 No
"area" of law should be treated as if it existed in a vacuum; each
"area" is "part and parcel of the whole body of our law."'30 Referring to the dangers involved in isolating patent law in the
province of a specialized court, he noted:
In a democratic society the law, in the long run,
tends to approach commonly accepted views of right
and wrong. Thereby it continues its hold on the respect
and allegiance of the people-in the last analysis its
major sanction. Once you segregate the patent law from
the natural environment in which it now has its being,
you contract the area of 3its
exposure to the self1
correcting forces of the law.
These views are not uniquely applicable to patent law.32 They
apply, mutatis mutandis, to the environmental field as well, stemming "from a conception of the place and function of the law in
a democratic society as the arbiter and mediator of conflicting
Whitney II, supra note 11, at 48.
Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Dangers of a Specialized Judiciaty,
37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951). But see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICTION 156-57 (1973).
30Rifkind, supra note 29, at 425.
31Id.
'2Rifkind fully recognized this. Id. 426.
28

29
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social interests and demands. A one-function
court cannot assist
33
responsibility."
that
discharge
to
law
the
Whitney and Rifkind are talking past each other. Whitney
speaks of the efficient allocation of resources, while Rifkind is
concerned with the role and function of those resources themselves. Logically, Rifkind must be answered before Whitney is
relevant. Whitney seems to have overlooked this point, and he
never deals with Rifkind's concern about the role of the
judiciary. The generalist character of judges is considered a
major strength of our federal system.3 4 "In the long run we will
get better decisions from judges with experience in all areas of
law. Environmental judges would not have the impartial viewpoints of district court and circuit judges whose broad experience can be brought to bear on their cases. 33
Whitney does not confront this point directly. He is primarily concerned with the charge that the judges on the specialized
court would be technicians incapable of deciding the more general, nontechnical questions arising in environmental cases. He
argues, "There is simply no valid basis for assuming that environmental courts would be staffed by judges not competent to
cope with so-called 'mixed' cases or with concepts derived from
other branches of the law."'3 6 While there probably exists a sufficient pool of qualified lawyers to staff a specialized court with
generalists initially, the evolution of both the law and the judges
is a major concern. If a large majority of the judges' time is spent
on technical issues, they will almost inevitably lose touch with
other areas of the law. Even a court that was once full of
generalists could become myopic if its judges were exposed to
only one corner of the law.
Lacking a discriminating analysis of the various judicial
functions, the proponents of the "expertise" justification for an
environmental court system seem reduced to the claim that the
judge (at any level) must be able to understand the significance
37
of the technical data before him. On this ground, all agree.
The question at issue then becomes how such understanding can
be supplied. Should a new court system be created to fill this
need, or can the present structure be modified to accomplish the
objective?

33

Id.
34 Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19, at C-12.
'5 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-10 (response of the Air Quality Subcommittee of the
A.B.A.).
36 Whitney I1, supra note 11, at 39.
37 See, e.g., Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19, at C-12.
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM
A primary problem in attempting to establish a new court
system is to define the system's jurisdiction. It is a problem which
the proponents of an environmental court ultimately have failed
to solve in any satisfactory manner. The comments received by
the Attorney General's office indicated a widespread fear that
establishment of an environmental court would result in "serious
jurisdictional problems with other federal courts. '38 Many disputes may have environmental aspects; 3 9 the determination
whether a case is "environmental" will depend on the precise
40
issues raised, giving rise to the spectre of forum shopping.
There is a real fear that
[a]ny court that would have exclusive jurisdiction of the
environmental impact of any action or on matters falling within the ambit of certain environmental laws
could and probably would end up with jurisdiction over
all the actions of the [Civil Aeronautics] Board since
almost any Board
action could have an alleged environ41
mental effect.
The fear that an environmental court might decide many
cases in which the environmental issues are minor appears to be
firmly grounded in fact. It would hardly seem logical to denominate actions of the Comptroller of the Currency "environmental." Yet,
[a]s indicated by the recent case of Billings v. Camp,...
Civil Action No. 1366-72 (D.C. 1972) involving approval
without an environmental impact statement by the
Comptroller of the Currency of a national bank's application for a branch, almost any action by this agency or
any other Federal agency could conceivably involve environmental matters ....

When an environmental mat-

ter is peripheral to the main issues of a case, such
[environmental] court would be no better qualified

38 REPORT, supra note 2, at V-4.

'" See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973), where plaintiffs sought to enjoin freight rate increases allowed by
the Interstate Commerce Commission to certain railroads on the ground that the increases would discourage the use of recycled materials and would thereby be injurious to
the environment. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin the increases.
40 REPORT, supra note 2, at V-5.

41Id. B-19 (response of the Civil Aeronautics Board).
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-and may be less qualified-to decide the case than
another Federal court would be.4 2
The chief advocate of the position that environmental jurisdiction can be properly defined is probably Professor Whitney.
His argument is that it may seem impossible to define precisely
what an "environmental" case is, but the courts have been defining it successfully for a few years now.
Just as there is a common identifying thread permeating the diverse litigation before the Court of
Claims, there similarly is a common thread permeating
environmental litigation.... Cases arising under.., the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean
Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
Noise Control Act, the Resource Recovery Act, and the
Coastal Zone Management Act are readily identifiable
as environmental litigation. In the case of citizens' suits
commenced pursuant to federal environmental statutes
providing for them, the environmental aspect similarly
is apparent.4 3
He argues that since the courts now determine which agency
actions constitute major federal actions affecting the environment, for NEPA purposes, it can hardly be impossible to identify
44
cases appropriate for adjudication by an environmental court.
In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council on
Environmental Quality, and the Land and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice seem to have determined
45
their respective jurisdictions without insuperable difficulties.
Whitney's argument is open to sharp criticism. He appears
to have overlooked a major logical gap: judgments about what is
''environmental" may be perfectly adequate for one purpose but
fail totally when the context shifts. It might be reasonable to
allow the Environmental Protection Agency to rough out a determination of its own jurisdiction, since the courts of appeals
will be alert to keep the agency within reason and statute. But
the same looseness in the definitional matrix might be intolerable in an environmental court. Supreme Court review is hardly a
confidence-inspiring method of keeping the court within
42 Id. B-57 to -58 (response of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (citation
omitted).
43 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
44 Id. 40-41.
45 Id. 41.
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bounds. 46 And the standard doctrine of federal law is that federal courts have the power to determine whether they actually
have jurisdiction over a case. A finding that the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit is res judicata of the
issue, if the question was actually litigated and expressly
decided. 48 Thus, uncorrected jurisdictional "mistakes" may
gradually extend the scope of the court well beyond its statutory
limits. It is therefore imperative that a court's jurisdiction be
more rigidly defined than that of an agency.
The jurisdictional problem cannot be brushed aside by Professor Whitney's arguments, cogent though they may be. Other
problems also remain, such as determining the point at which a
tangential or peripheral environmental issue in a pending case
becomes sufficiently important to suggest that the case be litigated in an environmental court. As this point is reached, it
becomes necessary to decide whether it is desirable that "mixed"
cases, even ones with a significant environmental facet, be decided by specialized courts.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

The problems discussed above apply with different force to
the three environmental court models proposed by the Attorney
General. 49 The general jurisdiction model 50 runs squarely into

the definitional problem. 51 Until it can be resolved, this model is
infeasible. The second model, a new court to review all orders of
federal agencies affecting the environment, 52 runs into overbreadth problems. Almost anything can have environmental
consequences. 53 In addition, the new court might "ignore
social-economic considerations with narrow attention to scientific
and technical details . . . . 54 If it exercised the same limited
scope of review of substantive agency decisions that courts of
46Cf.Griswold, supra note 10, at 1156 (using this as an argument for creating a new
appellate body in the tax area).
47C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 50 (2d ed. 1970).
48Id. 51. Exceptions to this rule exist when the policy in favor of finality of judgments is outweighed by other factors. For example, if a federal statute vests exclusive
jurisdiction of a particular kind of case in the federal courts, a determination by a state
court that it has jurisdiction will not be regarded as res judicata. Id.
4'See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
50This entails establishment of a court to hear all cases deemed to be "environmental", see text accompanying note 5 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-1.
51See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
52 Text accompanying note 6 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-2.
"a See text accompanying note 42 supra.
54REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the American Bar Association).
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appeals presently do, its significance would be unclear. 55 This
model, in effect, shades into the general questions and debate
regarding the establishment of a general administrative court. 56
And in any case, it would do nothing at all to help trial courts.
The third model, an environmental court to review orders
of designated federal agencies, 57 would avoid the jurisdictional
problems of the first model and the overbreadth worries of the
second. The mere delineation of jurisdictional boundaries does
not, of course, make this or any model a desirable one overall. In
addition to failing to address problems at the trial level, this
proposal "would sacrifice much of the rationale for creating an
environmental court. It would leave environmental issues which
arise under other statutes to be decided by the general Federal
Courts. '58 Finally, this model would tend to increase the
nonuniformity of the law by adding, in effect, an "Eleventh Circuit."
It cannot be denied that the technical nature of many environmental cases has caused the courts great concern. 59 There
is little reason to believe that the problems encountered to date
will subside. Nevertheless, the establishment of a specialized environmental court does not seem desirable. The uncertain benefits of such a court are not sufficient to override its countervailing features. The remainder of the Comment will explore alternative solutions to the problems which courts face today in dealing with environmental cases.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

A.

The Courts of Appeals

The primary function of the courts of appeals in environmental cases is to review the administrative process. 60 The courts
have what is basically a supervisory function:
In the exercise of the court's supervisory function,
full allowance must be given for the reality that agency
matters typically involve a kind of expertise-"some5 Id. B-33 (response of the Council on Environmental Quality). But cf. text accompanying note 28 supra (expertise).
6 See, e.g., Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19; cf. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 29, at
153-71.
57 Text accompanying note 7 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-2.
.'8
REPORT, supra note 2, at B-35 (response of the Council on Environmental Quality).
9
.1 See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 502-05 (1971); text
accompanying note 28 supra.
60See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 509, 511-15 (1974).
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times technical in a scientific sense, sometimes more a
matter of specialization in kinds of regulatory programs." Nevertheless, the court must study the record
attentively, even the evidence on technical and specialist matters, "to penetrate to the underlying decisions
of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do not
deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent." . . .Finally, if satisfied on these points, the court
sustains an agency even though its findings are "of
less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." The court is not to make its
own findings ....61
The court is not to evaluate the technical accuracy or validity of
the agency's factual analysis, as it would in a de novo action.
Rather, the court is to ascertain whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory discretion.6 2 If the court is
unable to penetrate scientific language, the best solution is to
remand to the agency. 63
Within this structure, the main "expertise" required of the
courts of appeals is that of the law of judicial review. Going
beyond that requires entry into the morass of arguments concerning specialized, or "expert," appellate courts.64 Two federal
appellate judges have questioned the wisdom of establishing an
environmental court filled with expertized judges. Judge Harold
Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit recently wrote:
The desirability of a specialist [environmental] court has
been the subject of active debate recently . . . . I am
skeptical of the proposal....
A second criticism is based on the view of the appellate judge's role .... Review to ensure balance, coupled
with restraint on the part of the reviewer, requires a
61Id. 511 (footnotes omitted).
62Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); NLRB v.
Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942). See generally 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, TREATISE § 29.11 (1958); Leventhal, supra note 60, at 511-12;
Nathanson, Proposals ForAn AdministrativeAppellate Court, 25 AD. L. REv. 85 (1973).
63
See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But

see Freedman, The Uses and Limits of Remand in Administrative Law: Staleness of the Record,

115 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1966) (questioning the indiscriminate reliance on this technique).
64 The more general question of the desirability of having all appellate judges expert in the substantive matters of the agencies they supervise is well beyond the scope
of the Comment. See Nathanson, supra note 18, at 999-1001. See also H. FRIENDLY, supra

note 29, at 182-89.
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generalist who can penetrate the scientific explanation
underlying a decision just enough to test its soundness.
A specialist whose attention was directed exclusively to
environmental issues would tend to intrude his own
judgment on the
issues, thereby coopting the discretion
65
of the agency.
Judge James Oakes, of the Second Circuit, is in accord: "[T]he
current system of review by generalist judges already allows for
the consideration of the best technical
expertise in the various
66
areas of environmental concern.
There has been no effective rebuttal to these ideas regarding the function of the appellate level of review.6 7 Professor
Whitney, in his defense of the proposal to create an environmental court system, 6 8 places most of his emphasis on the potential to
define the jurisdiction of such a system. Although Whitney cites
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
Corp. 69 in support of his argument that specialized knowledge is
required by judges in environmental cases°7 0 this does not specifically concern the need for technical expertise at the appellate
level. Wyandotte Chemicals was a case arising out of the Court's
original jurisdiction, and the Justice's remarks on the need for
expertise must be read in that light.
Under section 102(2) of NEPA, 7 1 which directs the courts of
appeals to assess the adequacy of environmental impact statements, remand has been the answer to agencies that cannot reduce their jargon to English.7 2 And, as Judge Leventhal points
out, appellate courts may gain access to technical experts in various ways. 7 3 In other words, it is possible to keep the advantages
of generalist courts and still plug in whatever technical input
those courts feel they need. 7 4 Furthermore, the court is always

65 Leventhal, supra note 60, at 517-18 (citations omitted).
66 Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENv. L. REP. 50001, 50012 (1973).
67 Dean Griswold, in championing the idea of an appellate tax court, stressed the

need for uniformity of law rather than expertise. Griswold, supra note 10.
68 Whitney II, supra note 11.
69 401 U.S. 493, 510-12 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. the majority's statement:
"The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent Special
Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to unravel these complexities is, to say
the least, unrealistic." Id. at 504.
70 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 42.
71 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
72 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971); cf. Freedman, supra note 63.
73 Leventhal, supra note 60, at 550-55.
71 Id. 550.

1975]

ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS: A COUNTERPROPOSAL

counsel to submit explanations of technical
free to require
75
matters.
In light of the nature of the appellate judicial process and
the availability of various methods for providing appellate courts
with technical information and advice, the principle of Ockham's
Razor7 6 seems determinative; there is not sufficient justification
for creating a specialized environmental court of appeals. Reform efforts should focus instead on the trial courts, where the
need for comprehension of complex data is most acute.
B.

The Trial Courts

Several recently enacted federal environmental statutes authorize citizens to bring civil actions against any person alleged to
be in violation of either an effluent (or other environmental)
standard or limitation or any order issued by the administrator
of the relevant environmental agency. Actions may also be
brought against the administrator himself when there is an al77
leged failure on his part to perform any nondiscretionary duty.
Jurisdiction is vested in the district courts. The traditional model
of environmental litigation involved appellate review of the decision of an administrative agency which had already made the
requisite technical findings; now, the district courts must embroil
themselves in the technical controversy. The Supreme Court
made this duty explicit in Washington v. General Motors Corp.78
Eighteen states sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction
in an action to enjoin the four major auto manufacturers' violation of federal antipollution laws. The Court declined to exercise
its jurisdiction, and remanded the plaintiffs to their respective
district courts. Those district courts will have to hear evidence to
determine whether specific technical standards have been violated, and they will not have any presumptively correct administrative findings to ease their task.
Another case which raises the problem of technical factual
disputes involved a local citizens group's declaratory and injunctive action seeking to prevent the defendants from authorizing
further municipal sewer hookup permits. It was alleged that issuing such permits would result in discharges that would affect the
7 See id. 545-46. See also Leventhal, Cues and Compassesfor Administrative Lauyers, 20
AD. L. REV. 237 (1968).
76 Generally: Do not multiply entities beyond that number which is absolutely necessary to the solution of the problem.
77 E.g., Water Pbllution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
78 406 U.S. 109, 114, 116 (1972).
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water supply of the Potomac River. The court, ruling on a motion to dismiss, held that a cause of action had been stated: the
complaint alleged that allowing further permits would increase
the discharge into the water and thereby violate the applicable
water quality standards.7 9 The case is not reported further, but it
is clear that if such an action were heard on the merits, both
sides would be expected to produce scientific data for the court
to evaluate.
In the environmental field there will thus be a number of
cases in which the district courts will have to weigh and evaluate
conflicting scientific evidence. The question remains how justice
to the individual litigants and compliance with federal law can
best be assured.
1. The Super-Clerk
One proposal that has been advanced is that "expert" law
clerks should be appointed to assist judges in the resolution of
technical factual controversies. Judge Charles Wyzanski experimented with this approach in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,80 an antitrust suit which raised complex
economic issues. His experience with his clerk, Dr. Carl Kaysen,
a professor of economics at Harvard, is quite instructive.
Judge Wyzanski found the use of an expert clerk quite helpful. Dr. Kaysen's analysis of the evidence presented on the record enabled the Judge to ask more probing questions of counsel
and the witnesses and more easily to understand the factual
questions in dispute. Judge Wyzanski concluded, "I have no
doubt that I benefited and in my opinion justice was served by
the appointment of Mr. Kaysen.' x Nevertheless, the Judge was
not certain that he would be willing to repeat the experiment.
He expressed the fear that the clerk, by reason of his expertise
in a technical area beyond the competence of the judge, could
exert an undue influence on the decision. In effect, the clerk,
rather than the judge, would be deciding the case.
Dr. Kaysen himself has suggested that there are two strong
reasons why an economist should not again be made a judge's
law clerk.8 2 First, it is unfair to the parties, who have no chance
to attack or rebut the clerk's technical analysis. Second, there is a
19 Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
so 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
s' Letter from Judge Charles Wyzanski to Bethuel Webster, Oct. 3, 1950, reprinted in
Webster & Hogeland, The Economist in Chambers and in Court, 1958 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 50, 67.
82 Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases, id. 43.
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possibility that the judge will not be able to make an independent
evaluation of the clerk's reports.
These arguments are compelling. 3 The use of expert
clerks, while lending much needed expertise to the judicial process, creates a substantial risk that judges will abdicate their function to their clerk. The parties to the litigation will effectively be
denied the opportunity to cross-examine a very influential witness upon whom the judge is likely to rely heavily. Thus, while
the "super-clerk" proposal would provide the expertise needed
at the trial court level in environmental cases, there remain serious doubts about the overall wisdom of implementing this plan.
2. The Non-Partisan Court-Called Expert
A second proposal which has been suggested is the appointment by the court of an expert witness.8 4 This proposal
meets one of the objections raised against the use of expert
clerks: the expert will be available to both parties for crossexamination. However, a number of problems would remain.
If the witness draws factual conclusions in an area beyond
the judge's competence, he would essentially be deciding issues
in the case. That is not the proper role of a witness. Witnesses
are supposed to present testimony to the adjudicator; they are
not supposed to become the adjudicator. Abdication of decisionmaking power to the witness would thus be a problem. If,
on the other hand, the judge can understand the scientific aspects of the case, albeit only with the expert's help, he could
presumably also understand the facts with the aid of experts
called by the parties. In that case, the court-called expert would
be superfluous. In fact, his superfluity even extends to cases
whose technical aspects the judge cannot understand: there is no
reason that the judge will understand his explanations better
than those of experts called by the parties.
Furthermore, considerable debate8 5 about the advisability of
8' See generally Webster, The Use of Economics Experts as Witnesses in Antitrust Litigation,
17 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 456 (1962). But cf. Leventhal, supra note 60, at 553-54 (supporting an appellate court's use of a super-clerk in environmental cases).
" This approach was used by Judge William Coleman in a complex patent infringement suit. With the consent of both parties, he appointed an expert of his own to read
and evaluate the evidence. The expert gave his opinions in open court and was subject to
cross-examination by the parties and the judge. The judge felt that the expert was "of
material aid in clarifying the intricate mechanism of the two devices, and the precise
questions at issue." Specialty Equip. & Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 96 F. Supp.
904, 910 (D. Md. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1952), on remand,
113 F. Supp. 161 (D. Md. 1953), discussed in Webster, supra note 83, at 460-61.
8. Compare Griffin, ImpartialMedical Testimony: A Trial Launyer in Favor, 34 TEMP. L.Q.
402 (1961) (favoring the use of such experts), with Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony
-Revisited, id. 416 (opposed).
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court-appointed witnesses has focused on the question of the
86
existence of "impartial experts" and "objective scientific facts.
It has been strenuously argued that neither economics

medicine8 8

87

nor

is an exact science and that an expert's testimony in
these areas will therefore inevitably be colored by his own prejudices. If this argument has merit when economic and medical
questions are at issue, it also has force in the environmental area,
where questions of fact and policy are intimately interwoven.
3. Masters
A third method of injecting scientific expertise into judicial
proceedings is the use of special masters, as provided for by rule
53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Special masters have
not often been used in federal environmental cases. 8 9 Nevertheless, their use offers a potential solution to both the jurisdictional
and the "expertise" problems in environmental cases, without
creating a new judicial entity.
a. The General Outline
The district courts should be authorized9" to make wider use
of special masters whenever the court feels that an issue of fact is
beyond the scope of its technical expertise. The use of special
masters avoids the major criticisms levied against the creation of
an environmental court system, while meeting the need that the
environmental courts were proposed to satisfy.9 1
Masters can be used in the federal courts "only when the
issues are complicated"; non-jury cases, which most environmen86Cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1971):
We already know, just from what has been placed before us on this motion...
that the scientific conclusion that mercury is a serious water pollutant is a novel
one; that whether and to what extent the existence of mercury in natural
waters can safely be tolerated is a question for which there is presently no firm
answer .... Indeed, Ohio is raising factual questions that are essentially ones
of first impression to the scientists.
87 Webster, supra note 83.
88 Levy, supra note 85.
89 One recent, notable exception occurred in the Supreme Court. Although the
parties settled the case (which came under the Court's original jurisdiction), the Court
ordered the parties to pay $50,000 to R. Ammi Cutter, who had served as a special
master in the case. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1974, at 44, col. 1-2 Cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 511 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" To the extent that wider use of special masters in environmental cases would be
inconsistent with present law regarding their use, see text accompanying notes 92-104
infra, the proposed authorization could be made by appellate decision, Supreme Court
rulemaking, or Congressional action.
9iSeveral of the groups and agencies responding to the Attorney General's request
to comment on the environmental court proposals, see note 9 supra, included the availabil-
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tal actions are, can be referred to a master "only upon a showing

that some exceptional condition requires it."' 92 The limitation has

been rather strictly enforced. The leading case is the Supreme
Court's decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. ,93 which held that
simple docket congestion is not the sort of "exceptional condition" warranting references to masters. The master can be appointed only to help the court in a case where such help is
actually needed. He is an "instrument for the administration of
justice [to94 be employed by the court] when deemed by it
essential.

Thus, the use of masters to aid the judge in carrying out his
judicial function is permitted as long as the master does not in
fact assume the judicial role. 95 The fear of abdication to masters
of the judicial function exclusively reserved to the judiciary by
the Constitution 96 is the primary objection to their use. Whatever
intrinsic force this objection may possess is, of course, not limited
to environmental cases.
A master's findings of fact in a non-jury action must be
' 97
accepted by the court "unless [they are] clearly erroneous.1
The Federal Rules thus explicitly recognize that the "expert's"
ity of special masters as a reason why a new judicial entity was not necessary.
The I.C.C. was generally opposed to the environmental court proposals. It suggested
that "if experience should show that the existing courts are incapable of adequately
handling the scientific matters in environmental cases, then legislative provisions authorizing more liberal use of special masters may be desirable." REPORT, supra note 2, at
B-70 (response of the Interstate Commerce Commission). The General Counsel of the
Treasury specifically adverted to the use of rule 53 to alleviate any possible problems of
technical complexity. He noted that the appointment of masters under the rule "would
provide any needed expertness without removing the decision on other points in litigation from the existing courts." Id. B-97 (response of the General Counsel of the Treasury).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). The rule is of ancient lineage, and is derived from former
equity practice. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524-25 (1889) (Field, J.) ("[I]t has
always been within the power of a court of chancery with the consentof [the] parties, to
order . . . a reference [to a master] .... The power is incident to all courts of superior

jurisdiction."). Subject to the exceptions stated in rule 81 (applicability of the Federal
Rules generally) and to the special problems raised by rule 71 A (condemnation of property), rule 53 now applies to all civil suits. 5AJ. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
53.02[1-2],
53.14[2] (2d ed. 1974). In addition, "[c]ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to
the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties .... This power includes authority to appoint
persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties .... Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (Brandeis, J.).
93352 U.S. 249 (1957).
94
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
.1La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); Hartford-Empire Co. v.
Shawkee Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
96 Kaufman, Masters in the FederalCourts:Rule 53, 58 COLJM. L. REv. 452,453 (1958).
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
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opinion, in a factual area beyond the judge's perceived competence, will actually have the status of a decision. Both parties will
have the opportunity to see the master's findings, to file their
objections with the court, and to challenge to findings on appeal.
Since the judges can use masters only as aids and not as
replacements, a blanket provision for systematically referring a
particular type of case-such as all environmental cases-would
not be permitted. 98 In McCullough v. Cosgrove,9 9 for example, the
order of reference had recited that the judge to whom the cases
were assigned was unable to try it because of illness; that all the
parties .desired an early trial; that no other judge was available;
that the calendar of the court was congested; and that the cases
had been pending for a long time and were complex patent
suits.10 0 Yet the Supreme Court vacated the district court's reference in a per curiam opinion, citing Los Angeles Brush Manufacturing Co. v. James.10 ' The James case was one in which a district
court had treated patent cases as a class, referring them generally to a master in order to unclog its docket. Although the
Supreme Court refused mandamus to vacate the reference, 10 2
the Court made it quite plain that, with the possible exception of
the necessity of giving criminal cases priority, there were no
grounds to justify reference to a master simply because a case
03
fell within a given class.1
In a later case, Judge Evans of the Seventh Circuit articulated the general policy underlying the Supreme Court's statement:
The District Court seemed to labor under the impression that the words "exception" and "exceptional"
as used in . . .rule [53(b)], are elastic terms, with it the
sole judge of their elasticity. Such a construction, we
cannot accept.
Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every
suit, save where exceptional circumstances are shown.
...Likewise, the litigants prefer, and are entitled to, the
decision of the judge of the court before whom the suit
is brought. Greater confidence in the outcome of the
. Kaufman, supra note 96, at 454.
"309 U.S. 634 (1940).
05A J. MOORE, supra note 92, 53.05[2], at 2942.
272 U.S. 701 (1927).
102 Mandamus was refused on the ground that there had not been a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 708.
103 Id. at 706-08.
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contest and more respect for the judgment
of the court
10 4
arise when the trial is by the judge.
This language may overstate the case when applied to a
court that must decide purely technical environmental fact questions. The judge presumably refers only those issues which he
determines are beyond his competence. It is hard to see how the
parties would have greater confidence in the outcome if the
judge decided those factual questions himself. It should be
stressed that the proposal contemplates that questions will

be referred, not whole cases.
It is still the law that reference may only be made when
exceptional circumstances warrant it. A case cannot be referred
merely to relieve a congested court calendar. Neither can a case
be referred solely on the ground that there are complex factual
questions at issue; a judge must at least be familiar with the
complicated and technical aspects of a case in order to rule on
the legal issues involved. Nevertheless, when there are disputed
factual issues which a special master, because of his training or
experience, is unquestionably more competent than the court to
decide, technical complexity is a relevant consideration in determining whether reference is proper. 0 5 Much of the environmental litigation at the district court level may involve complex
technical questions demanding specialized expertise. Although a
blanket reference policy for such cases cannot be justified, many
of these environmental cases may individually warrant reference
on their own account.
b. Jurisdictionand Expertise

One of the main objections to establishing an environmental
court system is the difficulty (at the trial court level) of defining
its jurisdiction. 10 6 Under the proposed plan, this problem could
not arise. The cases, as a whole, will still be tried by the district
courts. Those courts, in the exercise of their sound discretion,
may refer one or more factual issues to a special master. Such
piecemeal reference is explicitly authorized by the federal
rules.1 0 7 By leaving the question of what issues need be referred
104 Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 814,
815 (7th Cir. 1942).
10SFraver v. Studebaker Corp., 11 F.R.D. 94 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Kaufman, supra note

96, at 457.
106 See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). See 5A J. MOORE, supra note 92,
(giving examples).

53.05[2], at 2959-62
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to the discretion of the court involved, no formal, general rule of
jurisdiction need be laid down.
A similar analysis applies to the objection that a specialized
court will be unsuited to decide the general statutory and policy
questions involved in environmental litigation. 10 8 Under the
proposed plan, cases do go before generalist courts, and those
courts remain free to apply their accumulated judicial wisdom to
any and all questions at issue. Even if all technical issues are
referred, independent statutory and policy questions remain,
and the court retains the power to dispose of the ultimate issues
in the case.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is generally agreed that the establishment of an environmental court system would create more problems than it would
solve. Nevertheless, even the most ardent critics of the proposal
recognize the need to give the present district courts some way to
evaluate the technical scientific data involved in many environmental cases. Several alternative proposals have been considered,
and all foundered upon the same rock: if the resolution of factual issues is beyond the court's competence, then the advisor
will effectively be assuming the judicial function of deciding the
case.
This fact should not be disguised. It should be acknowledged and dealt with openly within the present judicial
framework. Through the increased use of special masters, federal courts can obtain nonpartisan expertise to evaluate the factual scientific material presented in environmental litigation. Because reference of a question to such a master is left to the sound
discretion of the court, there is no need to grapple with the
abstract, unsolvable question of just what is an "environmental"
case. Finally, preservation of the present judicial structure allows
retention of the accumulated benefits of having generalist judges
deciding questions of statutory construction and policy.
"08 See text

accompanying notes 28-37 supra.

